Abstract:
Local government is a critical domain for democratic engagement in developing countries. Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a much studied reform to municipal governance that emerged in Brazil in the late 1980s in administrations of the left-of-center Workers' Party. In principle, administrations that adopt PB devolve much or all of the decision-making on new investments to the popular mandate, via decentralized participatory forums. The impact of these reforms in the best known case of the city of Porto Alegre are well-known and include a democratic deepening and transformation of the practices of civil society. Little is known, however, about the impact of PB elsewhere in the country, with potentially less amenable conditions. In this paper we consider the results of a ten-city matched-pair study in 2004. Building on relational theories of civil society, on the theory of Empowered Participatory Governance, and on the Participatory Publics approach we consider the impact of PB reforms on civil society practices and organizations. We compare this outcome in municipalities with PB reforms in the 1997-2000 period with a matched municipality that did not have the reforms. The exercise shows that "making space for civil society" through PB reforms generally has a democratizing effect on civil society practices and networks, though this is conditioned by pre-existing configurations of civil society practices, networks, and its patterns of interaction with actors in political society and in the state. We identify possible causal pathways and mechanisms of interactions as result of the various starting points in our sample of cities.
I. Introduction

Local government is a critical domain of effective choice. Most of the services and resources that constitute development are either provided for or delivered through local government. This is especially true of Brazil where the constitution of 1989 gives munícipios a critical role in delivering services and promoting developing. Indeed, the degree of responsibility, authority and resources granted Brazilian munícipios is—with the possible exception of South Africa—unsurpassed in the developing world. But if todays’ munícipios have an important role to play, it is also the case that historically local government in Brazil has been notoriously elite-dominated. Indeed, the bulk of the political science literature on the Brazil points to what has typically been described as a dysfunctional system dominated by clientelistic and oligarchical parties that rule but can’t govern. If this is the case at the national level (e.g. Kurt Weyland, 1996) it is even more so true at the municipal level where politics have traditionally been dominated by powerful families or narrow cliques, and where the business of governing has essentially been one of highly organized rent-seeking. The problem is compounded by the extensive powers that Brazilian law extends to executive authority, most notably in budgetary matters. For all intents and purposes, Brazilian mayors have operational discretion in determining budgetary allocations.

A critical countervailing force to elite domination of local institutions in Brazil has been the mobilization of civil society over the past two decades. Across a wide range of sectors and involving a wide range of groups, Brazilian civil society has developed highly sophisticated forms of agency. Organizationally and ideologically, one would be hard pressed to identify a more mobilized civil society in all of Latin America. In areas as different as HIV-Aids treatment and dam construction, Brazilian civil society has not only exerted significant voice, but has also transformed democratic norms, and in many cases, democratic practices.

Yet for all that has been written about civil society in Brazil, we know little about how civil society organizations engage the state. Aside from Avritzer’s seminar work on “participatory publics” there have been few efforts to understand patterns of intermediation between civil society and local states. This is all the more striking given that there have been many efforts in Brazil to nurture direct involvement of civil society in governance. The constitution mandates the creation of participatory councils in a range of sectors such as health and education, and more generally encourages participatory inputs into municipal governance. Of many experiments in promoting empowerment that have emerged in Brazil, none have been more important than the participatory budgeting (PB) initiative.

First introduced in the city of Porto Alegre in 1990, PB has been widely acclaimed as a novel means of increasing accountability and participation in the formation of municipal budgets. Though there is wide variation in the actual design and implementation of PB, the baseline institutional feature is the creation of sub-municipal assemblies of ordinary citizens that discuss and then prioritize budget demands for their areas. These demands are then integrated into the city budget. In principle, PB marks a dramatic break with the patronage-driven politics that has long dominated municipal budgeting in Brazil. The case that has been made for PB follows along the lines of the arguments made in favor of decentralization more generally. Devolving decision-making authority downwards and into the hands of local actors increases transparency, taps into local sources of information, improves accountability of elected officials and encourages innovation. In the case of PB moreover, it has been argued that by expanding the actual spaces in which citizens can directly impact authoritative resource allocation, PB incentivizes citizen engagement. In this sense it represents a form of what Fung and Wright (2003) have called “empowered participatory governance.” But PB potentially represents much more than an innovation in the institutional design of governance. It also represents an explicit effort to supplement the structures of representative democracy with more direct and participatory forms of democracy, that is to make spaces for civil society. In its design, PB, as implemented in Porto Alegre, specifically seeks to expand the opportunity structure for civil society and to directly link it to authoritative decision-making by on the one hand reducing the transaction costs of participation for subordinate groups and on the other hand increasing the transactions costs of traditional elites. It does so through four mechanisms:

1) giving citizens a direct role in city governance by creating a range of public fora (micro-regional councils, district councils, sectoral committees, plenary meetings, delegate councils) in which citizens and/or delegates can publicly articulate and debates their needs
2) linking participatory inputs to the actual budgeting process through rule-bound procedures
3) improving transparency in budgeting process by increasing the range of actors involved and publicizing the process and by the same token reducing the possibility of elite-capture
4) incentivizing agency by providing tangible returns to grass roots participation

In this paper we are concerned with PBs impact on democratic deepening. We begin with the assumption that increased participation of historically marginalized actors is a positive outcome in and of itself. At the most fundamental level, the act of participation is an exercise in choice. And participation in PB, insofar as it is a form of direct participation and one that can be continuous and ongoing, is arguably far more empowering than voting (the traditional measure of choice). Direct participation requires active intervention in shaping outcomes, as opposed to the delegation of decision-making of representative democracy. Participation as such helps build capabilities through problem-solving, communicating, strategizing and what is in effect learning by doing. In this respect, direct participation is, in the Tocquevillian sense, all about the actual practice of democracy. Because it aims to provide direct fora for engaged citizenship, PB is a potential school of “democracy.” Direct participation can also have multiplier effects, as the skills that are developed in one sector or activity are readily transferred to other activities, as Albert Hirschman (1984) famously argued in his theory of the mutability and transferability of social energies. And such multiplier effects are all the more notable since collective action is the one potential resource that the disempowered have in relative abundance. But the capacity for collective action is not given or immanent. It
has to be constructed and the opportunity structure is critical to the possibility of collective action. Insofar as PB can expand the opportunity structure, it can have multiplier effects for self-organization in civil society.

In this paper we focus specifically on evaluating the impact of new governance structures on the vitality of civil society organizations. In societies where the formal associational autonomy of citizens is seriously compromised by pervasive dependencies, or in Dagomine’s phrase, social authoritarianisms, it is hard to exaggerate the importance of a vital and plural civil society for empowerment.1 The greater the density and diversity of civil society organs with the capacity for self-organization, the greater the opportunities for collective agency, and in particular for the collective agency of groups that are historically disadvantaged in other domains of action (the market, the state, political parties). Associational life is moreover in large part an artifact of institutional context. Abers (2000), Baiocchi (2005) and Avritzer (2004) have all shown that the introduction of PB in Porto Alegre had a salutary effect on civil society, not only by creating new channels of participation but also through a crowding-in effect, and helping transform civil society practices.

The highly publicized successes of Porto Alegre in introducing and expanding PB has had a significant demonstration effect. By 1997 over 103 municipalities, including large metropoles such as Belo Horizonte and São Paulo had adopted PB. In the 2000-2004 period, it is estimated that some 250 municipalities attempted or introduced PB. There is already a significant academic literature on PB. This literature however suffers from two important shortcomings. First, most of the literature has focused on Porto Alegre or other single cases and is of limited generalizability. While these studies have provided important insights into the functioning of PB, without the benefit of comparative analysis it is not possible to isolate the actual impact of PB or the variables that explain that impact. Second, in the few cases where comparative research has been done, selection problems and somewhat superficial analyses have limited the reliability of the findings.

II. DATA and Conceptual Model

Data collection and sampling

The data reported in this paper are based on in-depth analysis conducted by local research teams into the budgeting processes of 10 paired cities. The paired analysis addresses two key methodological concerns that have not been fully dealt with in the existing research. The first is the need to appropriately construct the counterfactual in implementing the evaluation so as to address concerns regarding the possible confounding effects of unobserved (to us) or hard to quantify features of the context (e.g., history of social movements, etc.), or what, in the evaluation literature, is termed selection bias. To our knowledge, there has been no attempt in the existing literature to directly compare PB and non-PB municípios. And while the case study literature has provided important insights into the workings of PB, there remains the obvious possibility that the cities where PB was in fact introduced may be non-representative. And that raises questions about whether any inferences that are drawn regarding the “empowering” effects of PB are generalizable to other contexts. There has, in other words, been no effort to control for possible selection bias. A second concern regarding the existing research is that it does not adequately take account of possible heterogeneity in treatment effects. By this, we mean the possibility that the effects of institutional innovations such as the PB might vary with the institutional setting and the political, socioeconomic and historical context. Even when the existing research has plausibly controlled for selection bias by focusing on before-after comparisons (of a variety of outcomes) within selected PB municípios, there remain concerns about the external validity of the results obtained because of the possibility of heterogeneous treatment effects.

The research design of this project attempts to directly address these concerns. We evaluate the efficacy of PB initiatives through a series of carefully constructed matched comparisons between PB and non-PB municípios within each of a number of different categories of municípios—e.g., poor, mid-sized municípios in the northeast, or prosperous smaller municípios in the south. Through our choice of a particular matching rule, which we detail below, we aimed to minimize the effects of selection bias. And by carrying out the matched comparisons for different types of municípios, we attempt to take account of possible heterogeneity in treatment effects.

The matching rule we employed was to match, within each category of municípios, PB municípios with non-PB municípios based on the degree of similarity in the vote shares of key political parties—in particular the Partido dos Trabalhadores, or Workers’ Party (PT) —in municipal elections. So, for instance, we can compare outcomes in a municipality where the PT came to power with a small margin of victory and subsequently implemented the PB, with those in a municipality in the same category, where the PT’s vote share was only somewhat lower but translated into a small margin of loss for the PT, resulting in a non-PT municipal administration, and in particular, one that did not subsequently introduce the PB.

Our choice of this matching rule was motivated by our contention that vote shares for political parties, especially for parties that have a clearly delineated platform and agenda, are likely to reflect (and hence capture) important aspects of the underlying socio-historical and political economic context. In other words, our maintained assumption is that two municípios in which, for instance, the PT, garnered similar vote shares, are unlikely to differ much in terms of those aspects of the local context—e.g. a tradition of political activism, the degree to which clientelistic relations are engrained in the political culture—that might otherwise confound an evaluation of the PB. On the other hand, small differences in vote shares can lead to large (discontinuous) differences in political outcomes—e.g., which party ends up controlling the municipal administration—which in turn leads, in many cases, to large (discontinuous) changes in policy such as the

1 The term “empowerment” has become overused and has as such lost much of its definitional specificity. We use the term in a strictly social-relational sense. First, the most significant forms of power are collective, and second, to “empower” means to shift an existing balance of institutional or social power in favor of a subordinate group. If such shifts can have positive-sum outcomes in the long run (e.g. more efficient distributional outcomes), in the short-run they are generally met by resistance from those groups that stand to lose from the new equilibrium.
introduction of PB. A matched comparison of municípios with similar vote shares but large differences in political outcomes that coincide with large differences in policy therefore provides some hope of cleanly identifying the impact of the difference in policy, which in our case is the introduction of participatory budgeting. Under the maintained assumption that vote shares capture the relevant aspects of the local context, our research design is therefore a variant of the regression-discontinuity design, originally proposed by Campbell (1969) and subsequently applied and refined in a variety of settings e.g., Angrist and Lavy (1999).

The paired research was conducted by teams of investigators in the various regions of Brazil. Our civil-society partner in this research, Brazilian NGO CIDADE, and the Brazil team coordinator, Marcelo Kunrath Silva, were charged with hiring and training teams of researchers with ties to NGOs or Universities in each of the areas. We developed and translated a field-research instrument and created an interview schedule that identified key informants in each municipio. Key informants included administrators at various levels in the 1997-2000 administration, including officers in charge of budgeting, planning, and popular participation, as well as the Mayor and heads of municipal departments. It also included legislators from the ruling and opposition party, leaders of civil society organizations, local unions, business organizations, and political party heads. Based on feedback from a pilot study of the first matched pair (Sapucaia and Gravataí) we adapted our instrument and held a workshop with field researchers. They were organized into teams of two—i.e., two field researchers who were present at all interviews. The field research in each municipality was organized into the following sequence:

1. A first attempt to fill out the municipality-level fact sheet using information from secondary sources. This was done at the outset, prior to the field visit.
2. A first visit of roughly 10 days that was used to complete the municipality-level fact sheet, establish contacts, identify potential key respondents and to perhaps even carry out some of the semi-structured (key respondent) interviews or open-ended interviews with significant actors.
3. Following the first visit, a thorough review was conducted of the information obtained from the first visit. Areas where more information was needed to complete the municipality fact sheets was identified, appointments for further interviews were made, etc.
4. A second visit, again of roughly 10 days for completion of all interviews (key respondents and significant actors).

The Conceptual Model

This study is concerned with the empowerment of civil society. We argue that the empowerment of civil society requires both self-organization – which we define as the capacity for collective and self-determined demand making - and a favorable opportunity structure, by which we specifically mean the opportunity for civil society actors to effectively and meaningfully engage the local state. We treat these two dimensions of empowerment in relational terms, that is as mutually conditioned. Associational life in democracies is always in large measure an artifact of the opportunity structure. An opening or expansion in the opportunity structure is itself a result of changes in political conditions, including the strength and self-organization of civil society.

We are concerned here with a specific form of the expansion of the opportunity structure, the introduction of PB. PB was explicitly conceptualized as a means of broadening and deepening the scope of engagement with the state. To the extent that the actual implementation of PB does indeed expand the opportunity structure (specifically by making direct civil society engagement in governance possible) it can also have multiplier effects for self-organization in civil society. At the same time, the very introduction of PB is the result of a political process, and many have argued that its impact is predicated on the strength of civil society. Without the proper methodological design, it is as such very difficult to disentangle the actual impact of PB on the empowerment of civil society.

We define the opportunity structure as the scope and quality of opportunities for civil society to interface with the local state. We divide the concept into two distinct categories. First, the institutional setting refers both to the institutional surface area,(the scope and degree of inclusiveness of spaces and points of contact between state and public) and institutional processes (how social demands are processed). The institutional surface areas can be very narrow, as the historical norm for municipal governance in Brazil where all demands are processed through the mayor’s office or very broad, as when demands are processed through multiple channels and there is a dispersion of decision-making. Our paired model specifically tests the extent to which the introduction of PB does allow for more direct and more binding forms of participation.

Of course, we also recognize that the political field is a key dimension of the opportunity structure. The type of political parties that are active in any municipio and the mode through which they engage the state will have a significant impact on how civil society is organized and linked to the state. To some extent our model controls for this by selecting only municipios where the PT has a significant presence (between 36% and 49%) and by pairing cities that have the closest PT vote share possible within the other selection criteria (region and size).

Our paired cities design creates the following model. In paired municipios with similar political fields the “accident” of a few percentage points difference in an electoral outcome leads to an institutional opening (those cities in which the PT comes to power and implements PB) or the status quo (those cities in which the PT loses and the PB is not introduced). Our study gathered data on all these variables, but in this paper we focus primarily on changes in civil society.

If much of the literature has tended towards a reification of civil society, we are interested in identifying “actually existing civil societies” (Mamdani) and problematizing the democracy-enhancing effects of civil society. We begin with the recognition that civil society is fragile and contingent, that it can vary dramatically in its composition and activity level, and well as in its effects. As Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens...
(1992) have shown, the presence of a robust civil society has been a determining factor in the democratic trajectories of South America, Central America, and the Caribbean. But, in contrast to neo-Toquevillian views of civil society that simply equate associationalism with democratization, Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens argue that it “is not the density of civil society per se, but the empowerment of previously excluded classes aided by this density that improves the chances of democratization” (1992, 50). Developing an argument first formulated by Thernborn (1977), they show that the self-organization of the working class is critical to the prospects of democratization. In turn, the existence of a robust civil society is important because it creates the spaces in which subordinate groups can associate and self-organize, increasing the likelihood that these groups will become coherent political actors capable of independently articulating their interests. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens emphasize this point specifically in reference to the state (as is the norm in treatments of civil society), arguing that a strong civil society is one in which state repression or direct control of social activity is limited. But the existence of public spaces also means that subordinate actors can organize free of a range of social dependencies, most notably direct material dependencies (debt bondage, manor-based tenancy, guilds) as well as pre-democratic authority structures (chiefs, castes, caciques, rural bosses). If this is the democratic ideal-type of civil society, we have to also recognize that civil society can also become the conduit through which reactionary elites or authoritarian regimes mobilize support, as in the case of the fall of democracy in Weimar Germany (Berman 1997) the building of authoritarian regimes in Italy and Spain (Riley 2005) or even more broadly state corporatism in Latin America. The general point here is that organizations in civil society are as likely to be schools of democracy and they are to be vehicles of clientelistic control and hierarchy.

In order to disentangle these effects we propose the following model based on two axes of analysis: self-organization and mode of engagement. Self organization refers to the degree to which collective actors in civil society are capable of independently organizing, that is mobilizing their own resources and forming their own choices (self-determination). This is a critical question since engaging the state always carries risks of oligarchicization, goal displacement and even outright cooptation. Civil society organizations, or CSOs, may be said to be either dependent when they do not have the capacity for self-organization and self-determination without external support or autonomous when they have the capacity for self-organizing and self-determination. Mode of engagement refers to how CSOs engage the state; we identify three modes: associationalism (rule bound and transparent procedures of demand making), clientelism (discretionary demand-making contingent on loyalty to broker/patron), and exclusion (no access).

Table 1: Civil society typologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Self-Organization</th>
<th>Dependence</th>
<th>Autonomous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mode of Engagement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associations</td>
<td>Tandage (State-Sponsored Activism) (Baiocchi)</td>
<td>Participatory publics (Avritzer) State associationalism (Ancelovic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clientelism</td>
<td>Prostrate</td>
<td>Bifurcated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Dynamic exclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The resulting two by three table produces 6 cells. Dependent exclusion (the bottom left cell) is the condition of civil society (if it can still be called that) under highly authoritarian conditions. The state exerts absolute control over political life and civil society organizations exists only if sponsored by the state. This type does not apply to contemporary Brazil. Associational autonomy (top right) and dependent clientelism (middle left) represent the two ends of the democratic spectrum.

The combination of civil society organizations that are autonomous and that engage the state through associationalism, that is as citizens that do have to sacrifice their political autonomy in order to have influence, represent in effect what Avritzer has called participatory publics. These are publics in the sense of being able to determine their goals and interests through communicative means and they are participatory in the sense of being linked to the state. This typology also corresponds nearly to what Ancelovic has dubbed state associationalism. Using the example of the alter-globalization NGO Attac in France, Ancelovic (2007) argues that it combines the new social movement features of a grass roots, federated and decentralized organization, with the old social movement logic of having a determined and instrumental political project of engaging and transforming (though not capturing) the state.

At the other end of the spectrum, “dependent clientelism” describes a civil society characterized by organizations that have little capacity for self-determination and engage the state through clientelism. In many respects, this has been the norm through much of Latin America, taking a variety of forms including state corporatism. It has been well described in the literature on “the popular sector” in Brazil and Latin America in general (Fontes 1995; Auyero 2001) This is the least effective form of civil society since it is by definition self-limiting. This is what James Scott (2001) has in mind when he speaks of a prostrate civil society, that is one that is incapable of mounting any challenge to the state. It should be noted that this is different from dependent exclusion since clientelism, while asymmetric, does at least involve an exchange relationship between the principals.

The category of autonomous exclusion (bottom right) is fairly common in developing democracies, as it refers to instances of autonomous civil societies excluded from

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2 The rise of Hindu nationalism in India (which is by definition antithetical to secular plural democracy) is only the most recent and dramatic example of how associational practices can be breeding grounds for anti-democratic ideologies (Hansen 1999; Jaffrelot 1996).
engagement with the state. In such cases, features of the social structure or a past legacy of civil society activity cut off by a closing in the opportunity structure, allow for a high degree of self-organization, but little if any avenues for effective engagement with the state. The organization of community neighborhoods created through land invasions in Mexico is a good example of the first pattern (Lavalle and Houtzager 2005), and the poblaciones of Chile in the post-Pinochet are good examples of the second pattern (Oxhorn 1995). Precisely because these groups are excluded, they often develop rich repertoires of organization and even contention, hence the label of dynamic exclusion.

The categories of “autonomous clientelism” (middle row, right column) and “dependent associationalism” (top row, left column) are the least familiar. Because neither fit the zero-sum view of state and civil society that most analysts work with, they have received little attention in the literature. Autonomous clientelism corresponds to what we have described as bifurcated civil societies. These are characterized by a well developed civil society, but one in which the condition of engaging the state is clientelism. Depending in large part on the opportunity structure, some CSOs engage the state as clients, while others are sufficiently strong and self-determining that they choose not to engage the state and retain their autonomy. Of course, any relatively well developed civil society will contain a mix of clientelism and autonomy, but we would argue that the legacy of Brazil’s social movements is such that bifurcation characterizes much of the popular sector. As we shall see this category does effectively capture the highly contested logic of civil society in many Brazilian municípios.

Finally, the category of dependent associationalism is the most specific to our analysis. Dependent associationalism results when a state invites participation without demanding allegiance, but is partnered with a civil society that without state encouragement would not have the wherewithal to organize effectively. The local state recognizes and respects the fundamental democratic right of CSOs to articulate their interests, but the existing CSOs have little actual capacity to engage the state on their own terms. This is the precisely the pattern of state-civil society relations that Tendler describes in her pathbreaking study of how state reformers aligned themselves with local level actors in promoting new developmental interventions in the Brazilian state of Ceará in the 1980s (Tendler 2001). This is also similar to the state-civil society relationship established in one of the districts in Porto Alegre where there was no pre-existing associationalism but where PB fora became central to community life, as described by Baiocchi (2005). We label this typology “tutelage” to emphasize the leading role of the state and the dependence of civil society. We are agnostic about the long-term democratic effects of tutelage. On the one hand, tutelage allows access to the state and gives new voice to civil society without producing clientelism. On the other hand, over time there is a substantial risk that the state (or a political party) will instrumentalize the relationship. Many have argued that the PT’s status as a social movement party is undermined when it comes to power and uses patronage to assert control over its movement partners. The fact that civil society prospered during 12 years of PT rule in Porto Alegre suggests that there is no iron law of oligarchy.

In presenting this model, we offer the standard disclaimer that these are ideal-types to be used as heuristic devises recognizing in particular that on the ground the boundaries between our categories are often blurred. Nonetheless, we believe this model brings greater analytical leverage to understanding actually existing civil society, and provides a basis for concrete comparisons across local cases.

The paired-city analysis that follows proceeds through three stages. First, we describe our municípios. Second, we evaluate antecedent conditions in the 10 selected municípios, examining the opportunity structure (especially the institutional setting) and the status of civil society (self-organization and mode of engagement) before 1997. We then briefly report our findings on the actual impact that the introduction or non-introduction of PB in 1997 (the treatment) has had on the institutional setting for participation (participatory governance). We measure participatory governance in terms of the mode of participation, the nature of decision-making and the scope of influence. Finally, we evaluate the post-treatment condition of civil society using the model elaborated above. The sequence of the analysis is presented below:
III. The Ten Municipalities Before 1996

The Matched Pairs

Following the regression-discontinuity design outlined above we selected five pairs of municipalities, one in the South, two in the Southeast, one in the Northeast, and one in the North (for details see appendix). This roughly follows the pattern of adoption of PB in Brazil in 1997-00.

Table 2: Matched Pairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OP Município</th>
<th>Non-OP Município</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Municipio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHEAST</td>
<td>PE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH</td>
<td>RO</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHEAST</td>
<td>MG</td>
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<td></td>
<td>MG</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SP</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH</td>
<td>RS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>RS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before developing our comparative analysis, we present brief sketches of each of our cities, with a discussion of the status of civil society in each before 1997.

Conceptualizing and measuring civil society is notoriously difficult. There are no reliable officials registers of CSOs, and such data would in any event tell us little about the quality of associational life. Some forms of associational life can promote broad-based participation, just as other forms of associational life can promote exclusions and privilege. Important characteristics include not only the organizational character and scope of CSOs, but also their relationship to the larger political field, including political parties and the state. In order to develop a qualitative picture of both the internal and relational dimensions of local civil societies, we asked our respondents 19 separate questions designed to assess 5 different criteria. The first three criteria were simple qualitative measures of associational life. We asked about the density of civil society organizations, how long these organizations had been active and their relationship to each other. We then also probed the nature of civil society’s ties to political parties and to the state, including the specific channels and modalities of interaction. The results are reported in Table A1 (in appendix).

Based on our assessments of these criteria, our first important finding was that, much as selection criteria of PT vote share presumed, each pair had qualitatively identical civil
societies. This underscores the extent to which PT strength and civil society are co-determined. The fact that we also found significant variation across pairs points to the importance of regional factors in the development of civil society.

In order to develop a more comparative understanding of the state of civil society in our 10 municipios, we also organized our findings using the model of civil society elaborated above. To briefly repeat: the horizontal axis is self-organization, which refers to the degree to which collective actors in civil society are capable of independently organizing, that is mobilizing their own resources and forming their own choices (self-determination). Civil society organizations may be said to be either dependent when they do not have the capacity for self-organization and self-determination without external support or autonomous when they have the capacity for self-organizing and self-determination. The vertical axis is the mode of engagement refers to how CSOs engage the state; we identify three modes: associationism (rule bound and transparent procedures of demand making), clientelism (discretionary demand-making contingent on loyalty to broker/patron), and exclusion (no access). Our qualitative evaluations of the state of civil society is presented below by pairs and summarized in Table 3.

Camaragibe and Quixadá are both in the Northeastern states of Pernambuco and Ceará. The Northeast is of course infamous for its low levels of development and for the political dominance of traditional oligarchs. Well into the 1990s, politics in both cities were dominated by traditional families. Though there has been some significant growth of civil society, especially from the Catholic church, social movements have had far less an impact than in the South and South East. In Quixadá, very little has changed. Politics remain personality-based, clientelistic and very hierarchical. In Camaragibe and Quixadá civil society was poorly organized, and with some exceptions in the case of Quixadá, subject to control. In our scheme, civil society is classified as prostrate.

Also in the same cell before 1997 are the cities of Gravatá and Sapucaia in Rio Grande do Sul, which have the distinction of being cities on the periphery of Porto Alegre. Along a range of key socio-economic and political factors the municipios are very similar. Both have solid industrial bases and significant revenue sources. Both are confronted with the problems of rapid urbanization, and in particular a concentrated and impoverished low-income population with little access to urban infrastructure. And until 1996, both cities were microcosms of Brazil’s political culture. On the one hand, political power was vested in fragmented oligarchic parties whose electoral support was built on the strength of clientelistic politics. On the other hand, Brazil’s protracted democratization struggle has produced a wide, diverse and sophisticated slate of civil society actors, in particular active public employee unions that were the support base of the PT. In both Gravatá and Sapucaia, civil society organizations were weak, isolated and highly dependent.

In contrast to the first two pairs, the next two pairs in the States of São Paulo and Minas Gerais, respectively, local civil society bears the mark of the new social movements of the 1980s, particularly, the new unionism.

Mauá and Diadema in São Paulo are mid-sized industrial towns. What marks them as somewhat unique is that they are the birthplace of the PT. Diadema has an especially active and “combative” (the specific term used by our respondents) civil society, so much so that the movement sector has actually been wary of institutionalizing participation. In Diadema and Mauá had the most developed and organized local civil societies in 1996. Diadema’s civil society organizations (CSOs) which included neighborhood associations, the moradia movement (homeless/housing movement), health organizations, unions, church organizations and samba schools demonstrated a particularly high level of organization, and specifically the capacity for autonomous demand-making. These various civil society organizations had had significant impact on policy-making, and despite their close ties to the PT they maintained independent organizational capacity. They had moreover developed a very high degree of horizontal coordination between movement organizations.

Mauá’s civil society, though born of the same social movement history as Diadema’s, was divided between CSOs closely tied to and dependent on the state, and more autonomous CSOs commonly described by our respondents as the “combative” sector. The Sociedades Amigos de Bairro (SABs) had a state-sanctioned monopoly of representation of neighborhood residents with an estimated 95% tied to the local ruling party, the PSDB. The federation of the SABs worked very closely with the city between 1993-96 in the classic mode of assistencialista, including a program of milk distribution. The “combative” or movement sector had roots going back to the pro-democracy mobilizations of the 1980s and in particular the “progressive Church.” Movement leaders had received extensive political training from the Church and had developed horizontal and cooperative ties to each other through a PT-dominated coordinating organization the “Central de Movimentos Populares.” Because this sector was entirely excluded by the ruling elite-based parties, they adopted and developed sophisticated modes of contentious politics and established a significant presence in local neighborhoods, often marked by intense conflict with the SABs. Mauá in other words had a deeply bifurcated civil society.

João Monlevade and Timóteo are both, in effect, “company towns” in the industrial belt of Minas Gerais, an area known for the influence of steel companies in town life. Both municipios are also known for labor union activism and PT sympathies. João Monlevade, literally built by the Belgo-Mineira Steel Company, is is today described by some as a “leftist town” because of the strong presence of the PT, which first ran an administration in 1989-92, with backing from unions and community movements. Against the administration were organized business interests as well as the influence of the steel factory itself. But in 1997-00 the PT victory assured the introduction of PB. Timóteo, similarly, is a city that is politically defined by organized commercial interests that orbit around the steel factory, as well as a history of labor militancy. It also had a PT administration in 1989-1992. The community movement in both towns was defined by largely clientelist dealings with the administration, with the presence of outsider new social movements such as the movement for accessible housing, and the movement of domestic workers.
Both João Monlevade and Timóteo had relatively dense civil societies, with active neighborhood associations, community clubs, active unions, charitable organizations, and a plethora of organized business interests. In both, however, there was a bifurcation between those organizations and associations that engaged the state and powerful actors through clientelist arrangements, and new social movement organizations and combative unions that held a more combative stance. In Timóteo, for example, according to one respondent, “community organizations were very close to the administration” because of community partnership program that employed members of neighborhood associations. It was also in Timóteo that there was a monthly breakfast meeting between business proprietors and presidents of neighborhood associations. Against these older, “traditional” associations, both towns counted active social movements that retained their autonomy and that engaged in more combative tactics, often backed by progressive clergy and national organizations such as the National Movement for Housing (MLLN) that supported the homeless movement in Timóteo. In João Monlevade, the organized movement of housekeepers similarly engaged in protest activity and retained its autonomy, but did not have access to the state in the same way that traditional associations did. Both can as such also be characterized, as in the case of Mauá, as having bifurcated civil societies.

Finally, our last pair, of São Miguel and Mirante, in the state of Roraima, have civil societies characterized by exclusion. Both in effect frontier towns, where small scale agriculture dominates. Both are relatively new (having been incorporated as part of the expansion into the Amazon in the 1980s) and largely free of the entrenched political practices that characterize the rest of Brazil. In the absence of a dominant local elite, politics has been a relatively open and egalitarian affair. The 1990s witnessed the increasing organization and assertiveness of civil society organizations, in particular small farmer associations. In São Miguel, this propelled the PT to power in 1997 and saw the implementation of a fairly robust form of OP. In Mirante, a commercial elite was able to hold on to power. Civil society remained largely excluded, but in the absence of clientelist politics, was able to remain assertive. Mirante and São Miguel were also densely organized and active, but with the exception of a powerful business association in Mirante, were largely ineffective in engaging the local state. But because they were rooted in a social structure dominated by small proprietors, they maintained their associational autonomy.

It is notable that in all 10 cases, the majority of civil society organizations were of recent origin, formed in the 1980s and 1990s, and that no local civil society had developed participatory forms of engagement with the local state by 1997.

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**Table 3: Civil society before 1997**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Self Organization</th>
<th>Mode of Engagement</th>
<th>Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependence</td>
<td>Participatory Publics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Clientelism**

Diadema

**Exclusion**

Dynamic Exclusion

São Miguel

Mirante da Serra

We can summarize the condition of civil society in terms of our typologies. Diadema is a clear case of participatory publics in which civil society enjoys a high degree of agency, both in terms of its capacity for self-organization and its ability to engage the state without compromising its autonomy. At the other end of the spectrum, two pairs of municípos had weak or prostrate civil societies, that is civil societies in which associational life has little if any organizational vigor, and engaging the state produces subjects, not citizens. The category of “autonomous exclusion” is fairly common in developing democracies, as it refers to instances of autonomous civil societies excluded from engagement with the state. Autonomous clientelism corresponds to what we have described as bifurcated civil societies. These are characterized by a well developed civil society, but one in which the condition of engaging the state is clientelism. Because civil society is relatively strong and diverse, many CSOs chose not to engage the state and retain their autonomy. In our final cell, we have two cases of dynamic exclusion, two municípos in which the social structure (independent proprietors) is the basis for autonomous organization of civil society, but governance is characterized by exclusion.

**The Political Field**

The nature of the political field in our sample can be summarized briefly. Our selection specifically sampled for municípios with a similar political field, at least as measured by the presence of the PT. Given that the PT is a relative newcomer to Brazilian politics and is by far the most programmatic of all parties, its presence indicates a significant change in the political field. At the same time however we also found that with the exception of Diadema (and to a lesser extent Mauá) all of the municipalities shared many of the characteristics of traditional Brazilian politics. Thus in each município traditional oligarchical parties continued to have a significant presence and in every case except Diadema our respondents identified clientelism (as opposed to associationism) as the dominant mode of intermediation (for more detailed analysis see full report).

**The Institutional Setting**

The institutional setting (defined as both the institutional surface area and process) in all of our cases was even more uniform than the political field. This is not surprising given
that local government in constituted by national law, and that governance institutions in Brazil have generally been described by political scientists as elite-dominated and clientelistic. Existing municipal legislation moreover empowers the executive at the expense of the legislature. Not surprisingly, the institutional surface area for civil society participation across all our cases was very narrow. Before 1997, the only point of access to policy-making was through the mayor or powerful councilors tied to the mayor’s party or ruling coalition. In all our cases, the elected council was generally seen as little more than a rubber stamp with real power residing in the mayor’s office. Our respondents did report that some participatory structures – most often health councils – were operating before 1997, but none of these were deemed to have a tangible impact on policies or budgeting. None of the 10 cities had any kind of popular forum for deliberation or consultation, although Diadema had created 18 sector-based management councils that served as points of discussion for civil society organizations.

The very narrow surface area of the local state and the general dominance of local elites clearly inflected the institutional process which was characterized by various forms of clientelism organized either through personalistic networks (the small municipalities and those in the Northeast) or highly organized forms of state sponsorship of intermediate associations, such as registered neighborhood associations beholden to the mayor’s party. Diadema was the exception to the rule because the PT was in power from 1983-1996 and had close ties to civil society organizations. It was as such far more accountable than the oligarchical parties that rules in the other cities. By all accounts civil society organizations exerted significant influence over policy. However, it should be noted that these links were strictly of the political brokerage kind and dependent on the PT being in power.

In sum, in only 2 of the 10 municípios (Diadema and Mauá) was the opportunity structure open to direct forms of civil society engagement in 1996, and even in these cases openings were limited to the political field. Six of the other were either controlled by powerful, traditional patronage politicians, or by political parties that built their support through clientelism and none had yet to expand access to policy making and budgeting beyond the office of the mayor. The last two municípios were characterized by outright exclusion. It is moreover important to bear in mind that these relatively constricted spaces for empowerment existed despite the significant presence of the PT, a party that is more or less a proxy for social movement activation.

V. Reforms in the 1997-2000 Period

In this section we examine conditions in our 10 municípios after the 1996 election and the adoption in 5 cities of PB. First, we briefly summarize our findings on changes in the institutional dimension of the opportunity structure, and specifically in the participatory nature of municipal budgeting. We then examine in detail changes in civil society.

Participatory Governance

Our analysis of changes in the institutional setting – which is reported in detail in another paper (Baiocchi, Chaudhuri and Heller, 2005) - addresses both the process and the surface area dimensions of the institutional setting. For each municipality we asked our respondents a series of questions about how the budget is made and how, if at all, citizens are involved in the process. The questions were designed to tease out all forms of citizen engagement with the process, whether through informal mechanisms such as direct lobbying of the mayor or through formal structures such as the constitutionally mandated health councils or PB, or PB-like processes. If PB was introduced, we also asked further questions to establish exactly how PB was instituted. The type of governance was then measured assessed according to a number of variables. Our findings can be summarized along two key axes of participatory governance. The mode of engagement was classified as none (i.e. status quo), delegated (citizens delegate authority but don’t participate directly in discussions of demands) and direct (citizens participate in open decision-making fora such as neighborhood assemblies (which in all cases also included councils of delegates that were mandated to represent demands formulated in fora)).

The nature of decision-making power - the extent to which participatory inputs and translated into budgetary decisions – was categorized as none, consultative or binding. Given that participatory processes have no legally binding authority, “binding” in this context is a matter of influence and was evaluated on the basis of the observed degree to which municipal authorities took citizen demands into account. The results are summarized in Table 4.

Table 4: Synthesis of Participatory governance 1997-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Participation</th>
<th>Decision-Making Power</th>
<th>Consultative</th>
<th>Binding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>São Miguel</td>
<td></td>
<td>Camaragibe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diadema</td>
<td></td>
<td>Gravataí</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mauá</td>
<td></td>
<td>J. Molevade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegative</td>
<td>Timóteo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sapucaia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quixadá and Mirante do not appear here since no form of participation was introduced.

For the study period (1997-2000) eight of the municípios experienced some expansion of the institutional setting for civil society participation. Only Mirante Da Serra and Quixadá experienced no change. As might be expected, all of the PB cities saw the introduction of direct forms of participation. Of these however, only three – Camaragibe, Gravataí and João Monlevade – experienced the maximum expansion of the institutional

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3 It is important to underscore that by delegated we refer only to new forms of representation (in most instances delegate councils) and not to the elected city council structures (formal representative structures).
setting: participation was direct and inputs were binding. In São Miguel and Mauá participatory inputs was largely of a consultative nature. In Timóteo and Sapucaí (non-PB cities) the form of participation was extremely limited. Participation was delegated and the demands of delegates were not binding. Diadema was the only non-PB city in which direct participation took place.

VI. Pathways to Change: Civil Society After 1997

In Table 14 all of our cases are represented at both time points, with PB cities in bold, and arrows indicating the change in the 1997-2000 time period. As the table shows, 5 of 10 municipios experienced no change in the state of civil society. All were non-PB cities. In contrast, all the PB cities experienced changes in civil society. It is also clear from the table that PB mattered more for improving mode of engagement than for improving autonomy. Four of the five PB cities saw an increase in civil society agency, with one experiencing a contraction. No non-PB city saw an increase in civil society.

We therefore discuss the four pathways below, which we name government-induced change, scaling up, instrumentalization, and locked in place, or no change.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Self Organization</th>
<th>Dependence</th>
<th>Autonomy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mode of Engagement</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associationism</td>
<td>Tutelage</td>
<td>Participatory Publics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diadema</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Changes in Civil Society 1997-2000

Government-Sponsored Change: From Clientelism to Tutelage (State-sponsored activism)

In Gravatá and Camaragibe, the mode of engagement shifted from clientelism to associationalism and PB has promoted greater inclusion of traditionally marginalized social groups. In both cases, the PB instituted a formal channel of interaction between society and government, with clearly defined and publicly divulged rules (although there are also several “obscure points”) that broke with the practice of discretionary demand-making that has fuelled clientelism. Also, in both cases participation increased every year, and as projects were completed an ever larger number of community organizations were drawn into the process. Nonetheless, while there has been empowerment in the form of greater participation, this has not led to a strengthening of civil society’s capacity for self-organization. Civil society was unorganized to begin with, and the new publics and actors that PB invited in were mobilized mainly through circles of primary relations (such as relatives, neighbors and friends). In the absence of independent civil society organizations, civil society agency remains entirely dependent on the political process, and specifically on the support of the PT. These are clear-cut case of “dependent associationalism” or what we have labeled tutelage.

Gravatá modeled its PB on Porto Alegre, but modified the process to make it more accessible to the population. Participants in Gravatá’s PB had very little associative experience, by and large. According to interviews, the median participant was someone from an irregular urban area with specific demands and problems, but no experience in civil society. Owing to the political opposition in the first years from neighborhood associations accustomed to clientelist forms of intermediation, many of the participants chosen as delegates and councilors were first time participants in associative life, but who participated in very large numbers – participation was four times as high as Porto Alegre’s in proportional terms. Real changes in investment priorities and resulting projects gave the process increased legitimacy over the years. Similarly, in Camaragibe, high numbers of participants without previous associative experience joined the PB, which served as a stimulus for autonomous organizing. Two of the main movements that became more active in the city were the Gay Movement and the Black Movement, which achieved greater visibility through participatory proceedings.

The difference with the past is however not only in the actors and the processes, but also in the mode of demand-making. The inputs processed through the PB in Gravatá and Camaragibe are not the reduced form of demand-making posited in pluralist democratic theory (i.e. representatives aggregate the interests of their constituents). While civil society is not organized enough to establish its own autonomous settings for discussion and opinion formation, the state-sponsored settings of the PB are ones that rely on iterated processes of public discussion. The difference between expressing choices through representative structures and forming choices through public deliberation is precisely what distinguishes representative from participatory theories of democracy (Avritzer, 2002; Habermas, 1989).
If tutelage has made a positive difference, it is nonetheless a very fragile equation. Citizens must no longer forgo their political autonomy to engage the state (clientelism) and it is possible that under these much more propitious conditions intermediary associations will begin to flourish. In both cities, civil society respondents told us that there has been a rupture with the past; whereas before, “all were out of political decisions, today all participate.” Many described a transformation “of residents into citizens, who all discuss the problems of their street, neighborhood, and increasingly, their city.” On the other hand, in the absence of organizational autonomy, civil society remains dependent on a reformist state and is vulnerable to either being instrumentalized by the local state (an outcome that critics of the PT often point to) or to a change in government which could quickly result in reversion to dependent associationalism. As one respondent told us, “yes, there is a high level of dependence on the government, but in an ethical way.”

Scaling up Civil Society: Toward Associational Autonomy

In two of our cities, civil society mode of engagement changed toward Associational Autonomy, or what we’ve called “participatory publics.” In one case (João Monlevade) it went from Autonomous Clientelism, or what we’ve called bifurcation, and in the other (São Miguel), from Exclusion. In João Monlevade, the see-saw of clientelism and contention was displaced by associationalism as the main mode of engagement, while in São Miguel an autonomous civil society broke out of its exclusion to engage the state. In both cases. In both cases, the new avenues of participation created by PB led to greater associational activity. Similarly, in both Civil Society could participate more actively in decision-making through the PB and this led to greater oversight and demands for accountability from civil society. Excluded social sectors and social movements such as the homeless movement were able to become active participants in municipal decision-making, as were neighborhood associations and representatives of municipal unions. Both can now be classified, along with Diadema, as cases of associational autonomy, the ideal-typical form of democratic civil society. Unlike in our previous two cases, civil society here started from a position of autonomy vis-à-vis the state and political society before the 1997 period.

In João Monlevade, similarly, the opportunity structure has been decidedly expanded as a binding and direct participatory process for budgeting was established in year one of the administration. Civil Society participants demanded an expansion of the PB to include “thematic discussions” and to include a discussion of the town’s long term development goals. Some of the town’s hereto excluded groups – such as the homeless movement (MSC) became active agents in the town’s planning and were able to include items such as housing projects as an important priority. The PB evolved to encompass a conference on regional development (the PMD), and the opening up of opportunities for community oversight over a number of municipal matters.

Instrumentalization: The Paradoxical Contraction of Civil Society

One case actually experienced a contraction of civil society, Mauá, which went from having an autonomous civil society linked through clientelism (autonomous clientelism), which we’ve described as bifurcated, to having a less autonomous civil society linked through citizenship (dependent associationalism). Our respondents, including 5 who were active in PB and CSOs, saw the “combative” sector as in decline after the introduction of PB. Before demand-making consisted of protests, petitioning and other forms of contentious action because there was no channel of participation. But with the introduction of the PB, civil society was brought into government and effectively demobilized. As a movement activist noted, “People went to work in government, but nothing changed because they stopped making claims.” Because the PB was perceived as not producing many tangible results, some civil society respondents saw the PB as a strategy to create accommodation in civil society organizations.

There, the participatory budget plenary meetings in the district did not have the purpose of raising demands and priorities. The administration held over forty such plenary meetings in the first months of its government primarily to publicize the financial straits of the municipality. The PB that emerged revolved around regional meetings that were still largely educational about the state of municipal finances and had the purpose of electing councilors to a “participatory council” where councilors do not decide on the budget but rather, have the function of bringing the priorities of their regions and neighborhoods to the administration. One councilor described it, jokingly, as “conselho escutativo” (a “listening council”, which is a play on the portuguese “conselho participativo”). Nonetheless, councilors described being able to exert political pressure on the administration, and there ultimately was some significant investment in some areas like health. Second, the creation and discussion of documents that listed regional demands and projects fostered accountability.

Locked in Place: Civil Society without State Reforms

Diadema did not experience a significant increase in formal participation in 1997-2000. Nonetheless, a well organized civil society exerted significant pressure through more contentious activities such as demanding access to city hall books and demanding improved health delivery. Dissatisfied with an attempt at PB, mobilized social movements were able to achieve gains by protest and mobilization against a relatively sympathetic and left-leaning administration. Because the contentious mode did secure significant influence, it became self-sustaining.

The case of Diadema is something of an anomaly. Here, the influence of citizens is not found in a formal structure, but rather in the overall strength and contentiousness of civil society. In Diadema, in fact, a PB was attempted during the first two years of the administration in response to movement pressure. The process however was limited to a very centralized format, with meetings being held downtown. Because of an unclear formalization of rules where ultimate decisions were taken by the administration and apparent lack of success in drawing large numbers of unorganized citizens (perhaps due to its centralized format), there were claims that more organized groups were able to
exert more pressure and this also cost the process some legitimacy. Fundamentally, because the raising of local demands was not linked to empowered decision-making on the overall budget or linked to knowledge of budget constraints, demands raised and actual projects were severely mismatched, which led to a discrediting and abandoning of the process. Social movement activists were however able to pressure the administration into publishing an annual “Budget Bloc” - a notebook that listed projects for each district and neighborhood as well as information on the municipal budget - as well as organizing training courses on the budget for citizen activists. Social movements were also active in starting participatory councils on health, social services, and education, where citizens monitored and impacted service delivery. Ultimately, the promise of a PB had the effect of mobilizing organized sectors, who dissatisfied with stillborn participatory attempts, demanded more access and decision-making into governmental affairs.

Movements continued to have influence, not through the creation of a regular forum, but by reorganizing themselves around sector-specific issues and by relying on sporadic contention (housing occupations by homeless) and or by working with elected councilors to make demands. The Moradia movement abandoned the general PB and instead successfully focused on pressuring the PSB to keep the housing council active. This council was organized along the basic participatory lines of the PB, and became the object of pronounced political competition between the PSB and the PT. When tensions mounted however, the council was taken over by ruling party allies. Eventually, the social movement sector took the decision to forgo participation and prepare for the next elections. If this strategic retrenchment resulted from a lack of opportunities to engage the local state, it left civil society in a position of strength, with its capacity for agency intact.

In Timóteo, Sapucaia, and Quixadá civil society engagement did not change much and remained clientelistic. In two of the cities (Timóteo and Sapucaia), formal mechanisms of participation were introduced, but participation in both cases was carefully controlled, even orchestrated by the local state, this form of participation had the effect of weakening civil society.

In Timóteo, as a response to the fact that PB had been a campaign promise of the opposition, the administration introduced a consultative participatory system called PROPOR in its first year. In PROPOR, there is a series of meetings between the mayor and residents in various neighborhoods in the city, in which the participating public, a large part of which is under the control of the presidents of Neighborhood Associations that have long been tied to the Mayor’s political machine, create a list of priorities. Participation in the government sponsored PROPOR program, a consultative and representative system, led to, according to our respondents, to “an increase in dependence,” because “you had to tow the line of the [government-sponsored] Community Council to get anything.” In a somewhat contradictory vein, however, some social movements – largely not represented within PROPOR - stepped up their contentious activity. Noticeably the homeless movement stepped up its occupations toward the end of the administration.

In Sapucaia, the Mayor introduced a participatory scheme, but it was a vehicle for clientelist cooporation. The Mayor reportedly met once week with presidents of neighborhood associations, and participants did report that individual demands were sometimes met by the Mayor: “there was a neighborhood that wanted pavement with the presence of one resident, and the Mayor met it.” But there were real constraints placed on participants. Delegates to the city-wide council of the “consulta popular,” or popular consultation, were selected by the administration. Any opposition to the way the program was run, was seen as “political or partisan. As as PT thing.” In the period, the mayor appointed the president of the Unions of Neighborhood Associations of Sapucaia do Sul (UAMOSSUL) as the Director of Community Relations and exerted tight control over neighborhood associations that participated, even to the point of providing financial support for the creation of associations in areas where existing associations did not support the Mayor. In sum, despite a formal system of participation, CS organizations in Sapucaia remained very dependent on the government. Of our nine respondents, six said there was no change at all in the relationship between government and civil society in the 1997-2000 period. One respondent told us that “it’s nice to talk about participation but the ‘Prefeito’ is the one who actually decides on which are the demands.”

In Quixadá, civil society also remained in our prostrate cell. Highly dependent on government officials and clientelistic in its forms of intermediation with them, CSO organizations in Quixadá were able to do little more than funnel some demands to officials in exchange personal allegiance. A previous PT administration had established the “City Hall and You” program which had left a legacy of expectations for demands, which was frustrated in the 1997-2000 period. According to some of our respondents, this tended to generate an even further distance between CSOs and the state as the state was not able to meet many of these demands: “There was a distancing of the population […] There wasn’t any space for debate and the population had more demands. The government could not meet demands and closed itself off.” According to one respondent, the administration would not “even dialogue to say no.”

Mirante continued to be characterized by the exclusion of subordinate groups during this period, in large measure because a well organized local business faction was able to maintain control over the municipality. However, in the absence clientelistic practices, autonomous and active organizations in Mirante da Serra responded to exclusion by mobilization and protest in the municipality in the period of 1997-2000. These organizations drew together the population of the rural region, having the strong support of the work of the progressive Catholic clergy, and closely tied to the PT. The PT won the 2001 election.

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SAS7
SAS4
QUI08
QUI06
VII. Conclusions
The concept of civil society is as exciting as it is confusing. The civil society literature has suffered from four shortcoming. First, it has generally taken for granted civil society’s democracy-enhancing effects. Second, while the literature has had much to say about the mobilizational capacity of civil society, it has had little to say about how civil society can effectively engage the state and influence public policy. Third, far too little research has focused on local civil societies. Fourth, the typologies used to describe civil society fail to capture the enormous variation in local configuration of civil society. Fifth, there have been few attempts to examine how institutional reforms designed to encourage citizen participation actually impact civil society.

We have attempted to address these problems by developing a two dimensional analytic model of civil society that takes into account both the self-organization of civil society and the general context in which it engages the state. If the first axes been the subject of most research on civil society, much less attention has been given to the engagement question. We then specifically tested the extent to which institutional reforms impact civil society by comparing similar municípios in which one introduced PB and the other did not. Our findings can be summarized:

Institutional reform matters. As our paired analysis shows, perceptible change in the condition of civil society took place only in those cities that adopted PB. In 4 of 5 cases, these changes were in the direction of democratic deepening. In the case of Mauá, an improvement in mode of engagement came at the expense of civil society’s autonomy.

As one might have anticipated, institutional reform mostly mattered for changing the institutional setting, that is creating more and more meaningful points of interface between the local state and civil society. Thus most of the movement in table xx is along the vertical axes – the mode of engagement. Institutional reform did no have much of an impact on the self-organization of civil society.

If our findings point to the malleability of civil society (change can take place in a relatively short time span) they also point to a certain path dependency. All the change occurred within limits set by the point of departure. Prostrate civil societies became more active, but only under the protection of a reformist state (tutelage). Those civil societies that were the most successful in scaling up as a result of PB and maintaining their autonomy, were civil societies that had already enjoyed significant self-organization.

Mauá represents our cautionary tale. In Mauá, PB has actually increased control of a political party in power over civil society. Civil society organizations that once enjoyed a high degree of autonomy (but no opportunities for engaging the state) have compromised much of their self-organization in exchange for inclusion in the governance process.

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Appendix

Since the quantitative analysis revealed that a PT victory was the variable most closely associated with the adoption of OP ($R^2 = .44$, two tailed significance $= 4.2E-26$), we utilized PT vote shares as our selection principle. In order to select a pair, we identified all municípios in Brazil where the PT had won or lost by an absolute difference of less than 10% in the 1996 election. This yielded 274 municípios, which we then divided by region and then again by size, and finally by the electoral strength of other political parties, and lined up into columns of adopters and non-adopters of PB. From this roster we sought to identify pairs where the OP adopter was a PT município, and where a matching non-adopter had a similar absolute difference in vote shares, a similar size, and a similar configuration of other significant political parties. This yielded a roster of 23 OP adopters, each with a possible match with between one or five other municípios. From this roster we selected our pairs, keeping our regional distribution in mind, and following the principle of greatest possible similarity between pairs.

Table A1: State of civil society in 1996 (PB city in Bold)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Density and extent to which associational life has taken root</th>
<th>Time of existence of organizations</th>
<th>Relationships between the organizations</th>
<th>Relationship to the Local State</th>
<th>Relationship with political parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Camaragibe/PE</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Recent</td>
<td>Isolation</td>
<td>54 - Patron-Clientelism and Conflictive Demand-making</td>
<td>Dependent Involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quixadá/CE</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Recent</td>
<td>Isolation</td>
<td>Mixed - Patron-Clientelism and Conflictive Demand-making</td>
<td>Mixed - Patron-Clientelism and Conflictive Demand-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Miguel do Gualdã</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Recent</td>
<td>Articulated</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirante da Serra/RO</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Recent</td>
<td>Mixed - articulated and conflictive</td>
<td>Mixed - Patron-Clientelism and Conflictive Demand-making</td>
<td>Excluded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guaíba/RS</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Recent</td>
<td>Isolation</td>
<td>54 - Patron-Clientelism</td>
<td>Dependent Involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sapucaia do Sul/RS</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Recent</td>
<td>Isolation</td>
<td>54 - Patron-Clientelism</td>
<td>Dependent Involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manau/SP</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Recent</td>
<td>Mixed - Isolation and Articulated</td>
<td>Mixed - Patron-Clientelism and Conflictive Demand-making</td>
<td>Mixed - Patron-Clientelism and Conflictive Demand-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diadema/SP</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Recent</td>
<td>Articulated</td>
<td>Conflictive Demand-making</td>
<td>Autonomous Involvement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>